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ABSTRACT This paper discusses two contemporary trends in local 
decision-making. Firstly, there seems to be more centralised decision-
making today than before in important policy fields such as welfare 
policy. Secondly, informal governance processes outside formal 
government structures open up for a substantial influence from non-
elected political actors. The paper asserts that there is a connection 
between the trends, and argues that the centralisation tendencies in 
welfare issues might affect and encourage governance processes in 
other local policy arenas. These policy fields are mainly within the so-
called ‘developmental policies’ that often facilitate more networking 
and partnership activities in ‘grey areas’ between the public, private and 
civil sectors in collective problem solving. Accordingly, more attention 
should be given to policy fields where governance networks operate, 
and the implications for revitalising democratic political participation 
should be studied. The paper concludes that the well-established 
rationales for local self-government and local democracy need to be 
reconsidered by taking into account these new decision-making 
structures. 
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Introduction 
 
Like the Scandinavian countries, many unitary states are characterised by a strong 
public sector with a great responsibility for welfare policies (health care, social 
service, education, etc), and these policy fields have traditionally been delegated 
to local governments for implementation and decision-making. Recent 
developments, however, seem to indicate more centralised decision-making, 
especially with regard to welfare policies. National agencies and politicians 
interfere with the way local governments and decision-makers execute their 
responsibilities. Thus, local discretion is decreasing and the scope of action for 
local politicians is lessening  (Østerud et. al. 2003, Fimreite et. al., 2007). In 
parallel with this trend, another development in local decision-making is 
occurring. Networking and partnership activities between elected and non-elected 
actors operating outside formal government structures and institutions are 
flourishing and growing (Pierre & Peters, 2000; Sørensen & Tørfing, 2009b). 
Thus, more and more decision-making is affected by the political activity from 
many local actors. There seems to be a development ‘from government to 
governance’ where informal governance processes involving many local actors 
are participating in decision-making processes. Both trends seem to “hollow out” 
the role of local politicians in public decision-making.1 
 
After exploring these two contemporary trends by relating them to different 
dimensions of local autonomy and different rationales for local decision-making, a 
question arises: Why should local actors and decision-makers bother to engage in 
local politics if the scope of action is reduced by central authority interference? I 
assert that the trends are interconnected in a way where the decreasing scope of 
action for local politicians in welfare policies paves the way for vitalisation of 
local politics through governance processes in developmental policies. This paper 
argues that in order to understand this, rationales for local determination and 
decision-making must be reconsidered by explicitly making a difference between 
local self-government and local democracy. Democratic and instrumental 
arguments in favour of local decision-making are explored and related to vertical 
and horizontal dimensions of autonomy. I finally conclude that justifications for 
local government and decision-making need to be complemented in a way that 
take the focus away from welfare issues towards paying more attention to 
economic and development policies. 
 
Changing Rationales for Local Self-Government? 
 
The different justifications for local self-government outlined below are an 
important backdrop for understanding the contemporary changes in local 
government politics and policies. The rationales for local self-government can be 
discussed in relation to what kind of citizen rights we accentuate (Marshall, 1964). 
Democratic rationales for local decision-making emphasise the role of citizens as 
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a citoyen and not only as a bourgeois in society. Liberty is a core value and 
political rights should be executed within the polity where collective life is 
“governed by socially validated and individually internalised rules, norms, and 
understandings.”(Olsen, 2009: 22)  Inhabitants are conceived as political humans, 
and society should facilitate political activities, thereby building a viable local 
community where people’s  engagement has an impact on decision-making and 
political life. Decentralisation and devolution in decision-making will make the 
polity more transparent and accountable.  
 
This line of argumentation focuses on the input side of decision-making, and is 
concerned with how the citizen political rights can be facilitated and modified. It 
is truly democratic, emphasising the right for everyone to participate in decision-
making that affects themselves and the community they live in. The citizens in 
municipalities should be free to decide for themselves to follow their beliefs and 
pursue their ideas as long as the decisions do not harm anyone else.  The 
participation in decision-making is considered as a good in itself. This liberty 
value favouring local self-government has a solid position in Scandinavian 
political systems. The argument is that local decision-making shall ensure 
democratic rights and thereby legitimate public policy by educating citizens to be 
engaged in politics as well (see Sharp, 1970). The democratic and freedom 
argument (with important educational function) in favour of local government is 
rooted in a long liberal tradition (see, for instance, Mill, 1975). There are, 
however, contemporary scholars who are critical of liberal theories because they 
insufficiently establish a justification for local government based on ethical 
grounds “as an independent entity in its own right” (Chandler, 2008: 355). Many 
justifications, Chandler argues, represent “the triumph of expediency over ethics” 
(Chandler 2008: 355)2.  
 
This expediential justification for local discretion in policy-making in fact 
represents the other main line of argument. This is a kind of an instrumental 
argument emphasising the need to improve public policy. Contrary to the 
democratic argument, this instrumental argument, as argued above, focuses on the 
output side of the political decision-making process. It is an argument where the 
deliverance of public policy in general and welfare policy are highlighted more 
specifically. According to this perspective, the citizens are primarily users of 
public goods, and local decision-making is supposed to be a remedy for improving 
the quality of public policy. The citizens’ social rights are in focus (focusing on 
the bourgeois role of inhabitants), and the criterion for political success is the 
fulfilment of public goods. To succeed, however, with a relevant and adequate 
public policy, it is always useful, and sometimes necessary, to know the local 
problem structure, conditions, culture, traditions, and values. Policy-makers, living 
far away from the locality where the policies will be implemented, will probably 
not have the same knowledge. Therefore, there will  be less possibility to succeed 
in targeting the real issues and problems. Input and decision-making based on 
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local knowledge and competence are regarded as a necessity to ensure the quality 
of public policy at the local level. Especially in the realm of the welfare state, the 
need for ‘tailor sewing’ based on local circumstances has always been the 
predominant argument for influencing local decision-making. The principle of 
subsidiarity to ensure relevance and adequacy in performing public welfare policy 
is a train of thought in all the Scandinavian welfare states.  
 
It is crucial to notice that both the democratic line of argument (grounded in 
freedom and participation values) and the instrumental line of argument (grounded 
in efficiency and effectiveness values) conclude with a certain amount of 
discretion to local decision-makers. In fact, since the origin of local government in 
the Scandinavian countries, these rationales have been predominant. This is in 
particular the case with respect to education, welfare, and social services. Local 
knowledge is regarded to be a prerequisite for a well-functioning welfare policy. 
Therefore, some find it more appropriate to talk about a welfare municipality  
instead of the more common welfare state in relation to welfare services in society 
(Grønlie 1987)3. To illustrate the significance of welfare issues (including 
education and kindergartens), the figures for 2007 show that 78 percent of total 
local government expenditures in Sweden4 are used in these policy arenas, and the 
corresponding figure for Norway5 is 76 percent. Bearing in mind that the public 
sector in both countries is large and that the municipal level by far is the most 
cost-demanding layer of public administration, these figures utterly emphasise the 
local government role in the welfare state, and thus accentuate both democratic 
and instrumental justifications for local self-government.         
 
These arguments in favour of local decision-making are, however, challenged by 
other developments favouring more centralised political processes. The focus on 
the equality value is most important in public policy. Especially the Scandinavian 
welfare states are characterised by a high level of equality in society. This is also 
true when it comes to services and welfare benefits. A comprehensive social 
security system, institutionalised social rights, universalism, and the anticipation 
that the state shall ensure equality among inhabitants with regard to public goods 
are universally accepted and are the hallmarks in all countries (Kosonen 2001). 
Thus, central authorities are in charge of equalizing policies. A challenge occurs, 
however, when local governments and authorities use their autonomy, and, 
according to the principle of decentralisation and devolution, actually prioritise 
their available resources differently. The result can be that the quality of welfare 
and social services differs a lot between inhabitants and municipalities. This being 
the case, national and local decision-makers are confronted with a dilemma, and 
have to consider two “worthy” values in public decision-making, i.e., the value of  
‘national equality in service delivery’ and the value of ‘local freedom to decide 
according to local preconditions’. The centralisation trend outlined below seems to 
give priority to the value of equality. Along with the trend in favour of expediency 
LEX LOCALIS – JOURNAL OF LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT 
R. Lyngstad: Reconsidering Rationales for Local Self-Government – Impacts of 
Contemporary Changes in Local Decision-Making 
97 
 
in decision-making, contemporary developments in local politics and policies will 
probably modify the rationales for local self-government. 
 
Is Centralisation Threatening the Vertical Dimension of Local Autonomy? 
 
Autonomy is a relational concept and it usually materialises in the decision-
making process. The degree of autonomy in decision-making will depend on the 
formal competence and real discretion given to the actors participating in the 
process. Local government autonomy will vary with legal, economic, and 
organisational frames decided by central authorities. We usually refer to these 
delimiting frames when asserting that local autonomy is confined. Local self-
government is about this vertical dimension of the concept of autonomy. Self-
government implies that decision-makers are located in the municipality and that 
the scope of political action is substantial. The vertical dimension of autonomy is 
therefore about power relations organised in a hierarchy where parliament and 
central government are at the top, and the municipality with its governing 
institutions is at the bottom of the hierarchy acting autonomously without 
interference from high-level decision-making. Two variables affect the degree of 
vertical autonomy at the local level: Firstly, the range of functions (including the 
number of policy fields) ascribed to local authorities. Secondly, the degree of 
discretion to conduct a policy without any interference from central authorities.  
Dichotomisation of the variables gives us the following table with respect to 
vertical autonomy: 
 
Table: Variables affecting vertical autonomy in municipalities 
 
Number of policy fields 
 Few Many 
Restricted 1 2 
Degree of 
discretion 
Extensive 3 4 
 
The categories are ideal types useful to study the differences between local 
governments in different political systems. The distinctions between the categories 
are diffuse in most countries because the dichotomisation of the variables 
represents a simplification6. The first category represents the narrowest form of 
local self-government. The local decision-makers have responsibility for few 
policy fields, and the central authority confines the local policy in a strict way. 
The scope of action is poor. Category 2 represents a situation where formal 
responsibility is given to municipalities in a wide range of policy fields, but the 
national government intervenes significantly to ensure that the policy outcome is 
in accordance with   the central values and norms. The discretion is rather low. In 
category 3, local governments have few tasks to accomplish, but on the other 
hand, the discretion to handle the tasks is comprehensive. Category 4 (extensive 
discretion over many policy fields) represents municipalities with many tasks to 
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accomplish, and their competence to decide on their own terms (without any 
interference from the state) is great. 
 
Researchers, politicians and bureaucrats in the Scandinavian countries discuss 
about which category contemporary municipalities fit into. Scandinavian local 
governments have general competence. Even though the Scandinavian countries 
are unitary states, many policy fields are relatively decentralised due to the 
democratic and instrumental arguments mentioned above. During the last decades, 
there has been a move towards the right column in the table. The question is 
whether category 2 or 4 is most appropriate to describe the municipalities. Some 
argue that local governments, particularly in Norway, are mostly loyal 
implementers of the nationally designed policy in accordance with the 
expediential justification for local self-government (Baldersheim et. al., 1997; 
Vabo, 1998; Hansen, 2001; Sellers & Lidstrøm, 2007). According to this 
argument, Norway is probably more “traditional public administration-oriented” 
than other Scandinavian countries (Hansen, 2001: 114), even though Norway is 
also  affected by new public management ideas. Some argue, for instance, that due 
to the influence of NPM, Norway experiences a large diversity in organisational 
structures and looser relationship between central and local welfare interests and 
professions (less segmentation). This trend makes it more difficult for national 
authorities to implement nationally designed policies at the local level.  There is 
less coherence in understanding and there are fewer channels for political 
influence (Fimreite et. al. 2007). Because of this, the overall “conclusion seems to 
be that the central government has increased its control over local authorities, 
leaving fewer discretionary options to local decision makers” (Jakobsen, 2009: 
223). A kind of administrative decentralisation (municipalities have the 
responsibility for implementing the policies) and political centralisation (central 
level reduces the local discretion) seem to be parallel processes.  This appears to 
be the case within the welfare sector in particular.  According to Fimreite et. al.,  
 
“The central institutions’ confidence in municipal actors’ ability to 
implement national policies within the main welfare sectors is 
reduced. As a response, central government is tightening its control 
over local government by introducing measures like management by 
objectives, standardisation, more detailed reporting systems, and 
individual rights legislation. Thus, the room for diversity and 
variation on the local level regarding, for instance, service 
production is much narrower now than it has traditionally 
been.”(Fimreite et. al., 2007: 165) 
 
Much research confirms this observation (see, for instance, Hansen et. Al. 2000, 
Fimreite et. al. 2002, Østerud et. al., 2003), and there are many examples of 
contemporary political practice and debates supporting this observation. For 
instance, in the national election campaign in Norway in autumn 2009, the focus 
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was on the following issues: the amount of cash benefits for people dependant on 
welfare, the regulation of the ratio between teachers and students in schools, 
individual rights given to elderly people, and to what extent fixed charges, 
tuitions, and fee-for-service recipients can be charged by local government.  The 
deliberation on these issues indicates very well the willingness of many political 
parties to reduce discretion and scope of action for local decision-makers, 
especially if media focus on large inequalities in service deliverance between 
municipalities.  
  
The researchers of the relationship between local and central government seem to 
agree that there is a tendency towards more central interference in local priorities. 
This is also the case with respect to the traditional welfare and education sectors. 
Thus, the vertical autonomy for local decision-makers is shrinking. It is not 
because local level of policy-making has lost responsibility for the main welfare 
issues, but because the degree of discretion has been restricted by taking various 
limiting measures, and by actively using “sticks and carrots” to make sure that 
national standards are met in welfare delivery. Local government has become “an 
instrument for more ambitious state policies aiming at equalizing welfare.” 
(Østerrud & Selle, 2006:4) Therefore, it is probably right to conclude that at least 
Norway fits into category 2 in the table above7, and the centralisation tendency in 
traditional local policy fields seems to challenge local self-governance and 
autonomy.  When the degree of discretion shrinks, the instrumental argument 
favouring tailoring in local service deliverance will lose its significance in the 
argumentation for local self-governance. When turning to the governance trend in 
local decision-making, the focus will be on the democratic line of argument for 
local governance in public policy. 
 
Is Governance Threatening Local Democracy?   
 
As stated in the introduction, informal governance processes characterised by 
networking and partnership activities are other important features within 
contemporary local decision-making in addition to the centralisation tendency. 
Conventional wisdom seems to agree that we are moving away from ‘government’ 
to ‘governance’, even though some scholars argue that “we should rather see 
governance as a ‘new perspective on an emerging reality’ (Sørensen & Tørfing, 
2009b: 2). While the centralisation issue is primarily about local self-government 
and related to vertical autonomy, the governance issue should be discussed in 
relation to local democracy and the horizontal dimension of local autonomy. Local 
self-government is about the competence given to local decision-makers, while 
local democracy and the horizontal dimension of autonomy are about actors who 
have power to decide over political issues in a municipality. The horizontal 
dimension is therefore about who actually participates in the local decision-
making process, and about how actors with no democratic mandate participate in 
the decision-making process. It also refers to whether they have a decisive impact 
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on the political outcome. If the latter is the case, the horizontal autonomy of 
elected politicians is weak, and democratic implications need to be investigated.  
 
However, the term “democracy” is defined and understood in many ways. In its 
broadest sense, democracy is about a government of, by and for the people. 
Democracy is usually characterised by a political system that allows the citizens to 
participate in political decision-making by electing representatives to political 
bodies. In most modern societies, the democratic mandate of the local level 
decision makers is based on local elections. In this indirect and representative 
democracy, political decision-making is supposed to take place through a chain 
from elections to decisions by using elected representatives, often called the 
“parliamentary chain of governance” (Olsen, 1978).8 
  
In most countries, this ideal constitutional and numerical model of decision-
making is rather inadequate to describe real decision-making processes in local 
communities as well as at the national level. The influential urban scholar 
Clarence Stone puts it this way: “Campaigns and elections are only the tip of the 
political iceberg. Beneath the water line of overt political activity, citizens interact 
with official state agents, and with one another in many ways” (Stone, 2009: 268). 
Therefore, to ‘grasp the reality’, power structures connected to the activity of 
interest groups, and corporations in the allocation of public goods must be 
considered (Rokkan, 1966) as well as ‘the privileged position’ of business 
(Lindblom, 1977). The importance of constitutions, legal systems and government 
structures is questioned by the public choice theory (Thiebout, 1956), new 
institutionalism (March & Olsen, 1989), and (neo-) Marxist analysis (Castell, 
1978; Pickvance, 1995). At the local level, the community power debate between 
elitists and pluralists in the USA in the 1950s and 60s (Hunter, 1953; Polsby, 
1960; Dahl, 1961), the concept of growth coalitions or growth machines (Molotch, 
1976; Logan & Molotch, 1987), the need for and focus on ‘developmental 
policies’ (Peterson, 1981), and urban regime theory, systemic/command power, 
and governing coalition concepts (Stone, 1980, 1989, 1993; Elkin, 1985, 1987) 
illustrate the complexity of political decision-making. They confirm that the 
parliamentary chain of governance needs a supplementary analysis to grasp the 
real power structures9. These analyses and discourses are most common in the US 
setting, but they are also relevant to studying European local policy and politics. 
This is especially the case with an urban regime analysis, even though there are 
scholars who argue that the theory is under-theorised and that it depends too much 
on the cases from the U.S. context (Pierre, 2005).  
 
In a European context, concepts such as governance, networking, and partnership 
seem to be more predominant in the analysis of political decision-making at both 
central and local levels (Rhodes, 1997; Bogason, 2000; John, 2001; Pierre, 1998, 
2000, 2005; Pierre & Peters, 2000). Especially the ‘governance’ concept has 
gained frequent use, and the resemblance to the concepts used in regime analysis 
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is striking. ‘Governance’ “shares many of the defining characteristics of urban 
regime analysis such as governing arrangements that include actors beyond the 
formal institutions of government, and the need to mobilise resources to achieve 
the capacity to act” (Mossberger, 2009: 48). Mossberger asserts, however, that 
scholars using regime analysis in comparative studies “have increasingly turned 
toward the broader, but related idea of governance” (Mossberger, 2009: 50). 
Therefore, the concept of ‘governance’ is of special interest because it has a 
growing popularity in the political science literature, and it is used within sub-
fields such as public administration, international relations, and comparative 
politics (Kjær, 2004). ‘Governance’ as a concept often indicates the development 
away from decision-making in formal government structures towards more 
decision-making as a result of informal governance processes. This is also the case 
at the municipality level, and there seems to be a move from local government to 
community governance characterised by a greater involvement of non-state actors 
in decision-making. According to Rhodes, “governance refers to self-organising, 
inter-organisational networks characterised by interdependence, resource 
exchange, game rules, and significant autonomy from the state” (Rhodes, 1997: 
15), while ‘government’ usually refers to more formal institutions and decision-
making structures. Sørensen and Tørfing include an element of instrumentalism in 
the definition and “define governance as the complex process through which a 
plurality of social and political actors with diverging interests interact in order to 
formulate, promote and achieve common objectives by means of mobilising, 
exchanging and deploying a diversity of ideas, rules and resources” (Sørensen and 
Tørfing, 2009b: 5).  The literature also makes a difference between ‘governance’ 
and ‘governance network’10. Klijn and Skelcher (2007), for example, describing 
the latter as “public policy-making and implementation through a web of 
relationships between government, business and civil society actors”, and the 
actors involved are “concerned with governance, i.e., the articulation, resolution, 
and realisation of public values in society” (Klijn & Skelcher, 2007: 587). 
Sørensen and Tørfing argue that “the central decision makers to an increasing 
extent view governance network as an efficient and legitimate mechanism of 
governance” (Sørensen & Tørfing, 2005: 199).  
 
In the discourse about the use and impact of increasing governance networks, both 
input-oriented legitimacy and output-oriented legitimacy (Scharpf 199), 
efficiency, transparency, accountability, and democracy have been in focus. 
According to Sørensen and Tørfing, governance network theorists “tend to agree 
that governance networks suffer from the absence of open competition, legitimacy 
problems, and the lack of transparency, publicity and accountability” (Sørensen & 
Tørfing, 2005: 201). Kjær asserts that “the democratic problem is that networks 
usually only serve some interests, and not the aggregate interest, i.e., the common 
will” (Kjær, 2004: 55), and she criticises governance theory because it fails to 
focus on issues of power, conflict and interest (Kjær, 2009). Likewise, Andersen 
and van Kempen (2001) argue that the democratic problem arises if the processes 
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are exclusive, the political outcome is not in the interest of the public, and the 
accountability of decision-makers is weak. In their  book about urban governance 
in Europe, they conclude that informal governance processes should not replace 
formal government structures in local decision-making because “governance does 
not exercise power in the interest of the public, but in the interest of the 
participants of the partnership, or at least in the interest of one or a few of the 
partners. Consequently, it is important to subordinate governance to representative 
democracy.” (Andersen & Van Kempen, 2001: 12)    
 
It is therefore important to ask “to whom the networks are accountable, and how a   
representative democracy works in the context of an increasing influence of 
public-private partnerships, involvement of voluntary organisations, and 
intergovernmental relations.”  (Kjær, 2004: 49). Sørensen and Tørfing  suppose 
that the democratic anchorage is sufficiently provided  “when a governance 
network is controlled by democratically elected politicians, represents the 
membership basis of participating groups and organisations, is accountable to the 
territorially defined citizenry, and follows the democratic rules specified by a 
particular grammar of conduct” (Sørensen & Tørfing, 2005: 222). To ensure that 
governance networks function according to these principles, Sørensen and Tørfing 
use the concept of metagovernance (the governance of governance networks), and 
argue that various metagovernance tools should be employed (Sørensen & 
Tørfing, 2009a). The main challenge, however, seems to be the democratic 
accountability problem (Papadopoulos, 2007, 2009). Even though relatively few 
studies address questions of democracy and legitimacy (KohlerKoch, 2006), 
Papadoupolos (2009) with a reference to a famous phrase of  Rokkan (1966) that  
the growth of governance networks in political decision-making seems to imply 
that votes count less and resources decide more than before.  Metagovernance 
tools may be useful, but “to subordinate governance to representative democracy” 
(Andersen & Kempen, 2001: 12) may still be necessary to ensure democratic 
accountability.  
 
Much of the literature reviewed in the paragraph above analyses the governance 
trends at the general and local levels. This also seems to be the position of the 
Norwegian `Power and Democracy `project. It was a five-year state-funded study 
finished in August 2003 (Østerud et al., 2003)11. The researchers claim that 
democracy as a chain from elections to decisions has weakened in Norway during 
the last decades. This comes true also with respect to local level decision-making. 
‘The political purchasing power of the ballot is diminishing’ as the researchers put 
it (my translation) (Haugsvær 2003). At the local level, this is mainly due to 
judicialisation of welfare benefits and services on the one hand (state interference 
as outlined in the latter paragraph) and a tendency to give governance networks 
more problem-solving capacity in dealing with collective issues on the other. The 
result may be reduced power for locally elected politicians.  
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The governance analysis is mainly concerned with the output side of political 
decision-making, and the review of various literature affirms that contemporary 
governance processes may raise some potential democratic problems, and thus 
questioning democratic rationales for local self-governance. The challenge is to 
make this form of decision-making transparent and accessible to all citizens, and 
to ensure that it is not a prerogative or an exclusive option for local elites. 
 
Why is More ‘Governance’ Occurring? 
 
After reviewing four books12 on governance, Christopher Ansell concludes that 
“these volumes suggest that governance networks are necessary for solving 
problems, and they are here to stay, but they also challenge some of our basic 
democratic commitments.” (Ansell, 2008: 471). Much of the governance literature 
seems to have the same conclusion and a further deliberation about ‘why more 
governance’ would be of interest. In the aftermath of the neo-liberal doctrine in 
economy which argues for more market and less state, the political climate for 
more involvement of private actors in decision-making in general and particularly 
in the public sector was good. In public administration and public policy, slogans 
like “less rowing and more steering” – often understood as “less government and 
more governance” – paved the way for New Public Management reforms 
(Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). The focus has been on efficiency in public 
management and on how to improve and accomplish collective goods. Especially 
activities in the “grey areas” between the public, private and civil sectors have 
been of interest. Potentials and problems – related to different frameworks 
characterising activities in the sectors – have been in focus. Despite these 
differences there seems to be a common understanding that more collaboration 
between the sectors is necessary to produce public goods in an efficient way. 
Thus, more governance and partnership interactions are influenced by NPM-
inspired ideas, and activities unfold within the areas where the borders between 1) 
political decisions within public sector, 2) market-related rationales, and 3) civil 
society potentials are diffuse. This aspect certainly accommodates collaboration 
and co-operation between the state and non-state actors in solving collective 
problems. The “grey areas” are, so to speak, the areas of deployment for 
governance network activities.  
 
The focus on the expediential side of governance and tracing the influence of neo-
liberal and NPM ideas seem to be the hegemonic perception of the contemporary 
governance analysis, and there is no reason to doubt this. However, I will argue 
that both the centralisation tendency in politics and the local government revenue 
structure are possible in complementary grounds for more governance in 
municipalities. In the paragraphs below, I will clarify this argument.  
 
In both the common political debate and political science, there has been an 
important discourse about what type of policy fields should be delegated to the 
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local level of decision-making, and what type of policy fields should be national 
responsibility. Many white papers have been written, and with respect to Norway, 
the conclusion seems to be that the local level (and especially the regional level) 
should have a larger responsibility for developmental policies. In political science, 
much of the literature builds on Lowi’s typology of policy fields (Lowi, 1964), 
and  Paul E. Peterson’s prize winning book “City Limits” (Peterson, 1981) has had 
a great influence13. He uses the concepts of ‘redistributive, distributive, and 
developmental policies’, arguing that central governments should take care of 
redistributive policies while local governments are inclined to and should take 
care of economically motivated developmental policies.  
 
However, the issue ‘what level of political decision-making should have 
responsibility for  policy fields’ must also be understood in relation to the relative 
discretion given to decision-makers. I will argue that the interference from 
national authorities in one policy field (welfare sector), where the scope of action 
for local governments has traditionally been comprehensive, has some 
implications for engagement in other policy arenas. Fewer policy options in one 
area may pave the way for more activity and interest in another area. The available 
“policy space” will be filled, so to speak. The reason for this seems to be obvious. 
Politicians need to prove that their effort and engagement as locally elected 
representatives of  people have an impact on people’s lives, and ambitious local 
politicians want to be more than just loyal implementers of national government  
policy.  They regard the mandate they got from the local election as more decisive 
for decision-making than centrally conceived enforcements. This attitude reflects 
the perception of local government as an autonomous political institution in its 
own rights (Chandler, 2008) and not only as an integrated part of the welfare state 
(Kjellberg, 1991). Therefore, local politicians will search for policy fields where 
their autonomy is real and their decisions have a decisive impact on the political 
outcome in a municipality. Such an assessment falls quite well within the 
supposition in ‘The Norwegian Power and Democracy’ document where it is 
stated  that “if we look a bit ahead, it is therefore not unlikely that the local 
government activity is restricted to the areas in which there are genuine local 
concerns, e.g., cultural affairs, planning, building and zoning, some areas of 
communications, and transport.” (Østerrud & Selle, 2006: 4) 
 
Accordingly, the reduced power of local politicians to pursue their own policy in 
traditional welfare areas does not necessarily make the local level of political 
decision-making irrelevant and uninteresting. Actually, new policy fields seem to 
be activated and developed, and a diminishing scope of action in welfare areas 
may form the basis of networking and partnerships through governance processes 
in other policy fields. These new fields are related to the local government role as 
a local development agent.  Economic and cultural policies are good examples of 
policy fields where central governments do not interfere in a restrictive way.  
Therefore, it could be more attractive for local politicians and other local actors to 
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engage in these policies. To put it another way, in the interaction between public, 
private and civil sectors there is a field of action particularly suitable for 
innovation and economic development. These policy fields, frequently located in 
grey areas, facilitate networking, partnership building, and informal governance 
processes, and they may substitute political activities in the traditionally important 
distributive and redistributive fields of policies14.  
 
Another explanation of the growth of governance networks can be more explicitly 
related to the local government revenue structure. The Scandinavian local 
governments have general competence, which means that they can undertake 
whatever tasks they want unless another layer of government has the 
responsibility by law. However, this opportunity is rather limited because 
mandatory tasks take most of their revenue. As stated earlier in this paper, central 
government uses many different mechanisms to make sure that local governments 
fulfil these tasks in an appropriate way according to national norms and rules. The 
number of national laws that regulate local government administration and local 
service provision, for instance, has increased dramatically (Fimreite et al., 2004). 
Nationally determined tasks are economically burdensome and most available 
revenues are tied up to accomplish these mandatory tasks. Consequently, many 
local governments have poor economic capacity to engage in other issues than in 
these tasks. 
 
This is the situation that makes many local politicians and decision-makers 
frustrated because  they are constantly searching for new sources of income. 
However, this is not easy15. Local governments in Norway derive their income 
mainly from three sources: taxation, transfers from central government, and 
various types of fees. The opportunity to affect the amount of money from these 
sources is restricted due to the regulations decided on by national politicians. The 
rate of taxation is regulated by the parliament,16 transfers from government are 
partly regulated according to “objective” norms and partly as earmarked grants, 
and many of the fees are also regulated by central authorities17.  According to 
Østerrud and Selle, “on average, 90 percent of municipal incomes are decided, one 
way or the other, at the central level” (Østerrud & Selle, 2006: 4).There is, 
however, one option that local governments are increasingly aware of, and that is 
to increase taxes as the main revenue. Even though the tax rate is regulated by 
parliament, more jobs (and thereby taxpayers) in a municipality will improve the 
income base for local government. A business-friendly policy and facilitating 
more collaboration with private actors are often regarded as necessary remedies to 
succeed with economic development policy in a municipality. Many CEOs of 
municipalities are, of course, aware of this and argue accordingly when the 
resources are scarce and the decision-makers need strong priorities. They will  use 
phrases like ‘local government expenditure for the benefit of more revenue’18 
when they argue in favour of expensive development policies instead of accepting 
various ‘carrots’ from central authorities which  aim at various welfare projects. 
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Since these projects sometimes imply ‘revenue for the benefit of more local 
government expenditure’19, the projects will have a difficult way through the 
prioritisation process in the municipality (Lyngstad, 1997). The argument will be 
that a successful economic policy is crucial because it creates jobs thereby 
increasing taxes. The decreasing scope of action for local decision-makers (due to 
poor economy) favours therefore special paradigms in local politics. These 
paradigms often emphasise and approve economically motivated development 
policies in order to ensure growth in a municipality. Explicitly, more focus on 
development policy is justified because it will presumably create jobs, more taxes 
thereby increasing the scope of action for local politicians in the future. This way 
of thinking makes way for new policy fields in the grey areas between politics, 
economic market, and civil society. This being the case, the climate is good for 
establishing local growth machines (Logan & Molotch, 1987) by using 
partnerships and informal governance processes20. 
 
Concluding Summary 
 
The debate about rationales for local government and democracy coincides with a 
political climate that has for some decades questioned the state’s role in allocating 
‘goods and burdens’ in society. Under the influence of neo-liberal thinking and 
NPM mechanisms, the public sector’s role in collective problem solving has been 
challenged. However, recent developments and discourses seem to re-establish the 
state’s role in society. The financial  crisis is obviously the best example. The 
reassessment of the political arena as crucial for allocating collective goods is also 
obvious within political and social sciences. Titles like “Bringing the State back 
in” (Evans et. al., 1985) and “Rolling back the Market” (Self, 2000)  illuminate 
examples of this interest in reassessing the relationship between public, private 
and civil sectors in society. The general governance debate should be understood 
in light of this backdrop. 
 
This paper addresses a smaller and more specific part of the polity, changes in the 
relationship between central and local levels of public decision-making, and, in 
particular, how changes in policy fields affect rationales for local government and 
democracy. Centralisation and governance tendencies are expanding, and the 
increase in governance and network activities at the local level must be seen in 
relation to the decrease in the vertical autonomy of local decision-makers in the 
traditionally important field of welfare policies. The retreat of politics in one local 
policy field seems to make room for political participation in other fields. 
Primarily, these are policy fields dealing with cultural activities, leisure issues, 
transport, industrial and business policies –  policy fields where interference from 
central authorities are more unusual. In short, all policies aiming at growth and 
development in the community will probably be more and more in the forefront of 
local interest. Not only because the local autonomy is relatively higher in these 
areas, but also because the need for more revenues in local politics is constant, and 
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political actors turn to these policies hoping to increase the local government’s 
revenue base.  Both elected and non-elected political actors are involved. Elected 
politicians partly because they must legitimate their political engagements in the 
areas and issues where their engagements have impacts and “local councillors 
search high and low for new ways that may revitalise their roles as important 
political actors and decision makers in local government” (Hansen, 2001: 120). 
Developmental policies are examples of policy fields where political vigour will 
have high visibility in the public. In addition, non-elected political actors from 
civil society and local business will be inclined to engage in these kinds of policies 
and decision-making processes partly for the same reasons as elected politicians, 
and also because they will often invest interest in the outcome (e.g., various 
business-friendly policies). Thus, a limited local influence on (re)distributive 
policies paves the way for more focus on developmental policies where 
networking and governance processes are more appropriate. However, more 
empirical research is needed.  The study focusing on the commitment and the time 
used by mayors and CEOs in the municipalities in relation to developmental, 
distributive and redistributive policies would be of great interest as a background 
for more analysis of the democratic implications of contemporary changes in local 
decision-making. 
 
Contemporary developments make it necessary to question whether the 
‘traditional’ arguments, leading to substantial discretion for local government in 
welfare issues (the democratic argument and the instrumental “tailor-sewing” 
argument), are important and ‘close to reality’. The democratic argument, 
favouring local decision-making based on the local freedom values, seems to lose 
value, and more weight is given to the national equality values in service 
deliverance on behalf of central government. The instrumental argument seems to 
be redefined on expediential grounds on behalf of national politicians.  In any 
case, the arguments are under great pressure, and justifications for local 
government and decision-making need to be complemented in a way that they take 
the focus away from welfare issues towards  more  economic and developmental 
policies where governance networks attain more importance. A reconsideration of 
rationales for local decision-making must also take into account another 
democratic infrastructure (the influence of governance networks) that may 
challenge the traditional parliamentary chain of government. Due to the central 
interference in the traditionally important local policy fields, the decreased vertical 
autonomy may paradoxically vitalize local decision-making in the horizontal 
dimension of local autonomy. Political centralisation in one policy field 
accommodates governance networks to engage in new policy arenas where the 
scope of action is substantial, and the relevance of political participation at the 
local level is thus re-established.  
 
There is, however, a somewhat paradoxical fact that local election campaigns still 
focus on distributive and redistributive policies. Why do they do this if the local 
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politicians’ scope of action is diminishing in these fields? One answer may be that 
being loyal implementers of the nationally designed policies, local actors are in 
charge of a substantial amount of money. This is prestigious even though the 
discretion is rather low. Research shows that most of the issues in local elections 
originate from the local context (Jacobsen and Skomeland 2008), but many of the 
issues are characterised by political centralisation and administrative 
decentralisation as mentioned earlier in this paper. Besides, the space for the 
locally conducted policy is big enough to make engagement and participation in 
welfare politics interesting.  A White Paper from Norway accepts, for instance, 
that the scope of local action has decreased, however,  “there are still a lot of areas 
for local policy-making”, “which seems that central instructions are not 
mandatory”, and “the local governments have space for innovation and 
development” (my translation) (NOU, 2005: 6, 11). Therefore, the argument is 
that even though the scope of action has been reduced for local politicians during 
the last few decades, there are still many policy arenas and policy fields in which 
citizens will find it significant and satisfying to participate or become involved. 
This is probably true today. But if the contemporary developments, pointed out in 
this paper and supported by the Norwegian `Power and Democracy` project, 
continue (judicialisation of welfare policies and more decision-making based on 
governance processes), the reconsideration of justifications for local self-
government and local decision-making seems necessary, at least in Norway, but 
possibly also in other unitary states with a comprehensive welfare sector. Such a 
reconsideration must imply more focus on power relations and democratic 
implications of growing governance networks at the local level of public policy. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 In a newly published article Jacobsen (2009) - with reference to new research about 
Norwegian municipalities -  is questioning whether these and other trends is hollowing out 
local authorities as conventional wisdom seems to assert. He maintains, however, that in some 
settings networking and horizontal governance structures may be growing. 
2 By an expediential justification “is meant those arguments that value an activity or institution 
only to the extent that it serves the purpose of another institution or activity. In the context of 
local government, this is, for example, to justify the institution as a means to secure efficient 
delivery of services on behalf of central government” (Chandler, 2008: 355). 
3 It is It is also a fact that many public services within the welfare sector were first introduced 
and implemented in municipalities and then launched at national level. 
4 See http://www.skl.se/artikel.asp?A=58868&C=370. 
5 See  http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/krd/tema/kommuneokonomi/finansiering-av- 
sektoren-samlet-herunder.html?id=552048. 
6 A white paper in Norway uses a more sophisticated typology of local vertical autonomy 
(NOU 2005:6). The white paper identifies three aspects related to autonomy. First, the scope 
of action, that is the formal possibility to act. Second, the possibility to act, which is about the 
possibilities in practice. Third, the ability to act, which is about the ability to reach given 
objectives. 
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7 This is a conclusion very much in line with the understanding asserted by The Norwegian 
Association of Local and Regional Authorities (KS). 
8 There are, of course, many complementary theories analysing the democratic potentials of 
different decision-making structures. Sørensen and Tørfing (2009a) mention for instance elite-
democratic perspectives (Etzioni-Halevy, 1993), communitarianism (Sandel, 1996), 
associational democracy (Hirst, 1994), participatory governance ((Fung & Wright 2003), 
discursive democracy (Dryzek, 2000) and governance network theory (Rhodes 2000) as 
theories providing a supplement to the parliamentary chain of representative democracy. 
9 The main conclusion in most of the analyses seems to be that seeking political power by 
influencing political decisions through the numeric-democratic channel is inadequate. Activity 
in “grey-zones” between public, private and civil sector is important to analyse if we want to 
understand decision-making processes. Informal governance-processes outside the overt 
decision-making system seem to have substantial impact on policy outcome. This is also the 
case on local level. Many studies show that actors without any democratic mandate from local 
elections have great influence on local policy-making and thus might represent a democratic 
problem (for example DiGaetano, 1997; Dowding, 2000; Harding, 1997; Lyngstad, 2000) while 
other studies have a more positive assessment of the democratic potentials (Andersen, 2004). 
10 We should of course notice that the concept ‘governance network’ is not completely 
describing new phenomenon in political and administrative science. Concepts like 
(neo)corporatism, policy networks, policy communities, iron triangles, segmentation and 
compartementalisation have been used to describe similar decision-making processes. 
11 It should be noticed, however, that there has been a debate in the Scandinavian countries 
about the conclusions in the Norwegian “Power and Democracy” project (Andreassen, 2006; 
Selle, 2006; Røyseland, 2006) and whether there is a parallel development in other 
Scandinavian countries. At least the Danish project is a little more optimistic about the 
democratic implications of more decision-making in governance networks. The Danish study 
seems to conclude that there has not been a systematic weakening of the parliamentary chain 
of governance in Denmark (Christiansen & Togeby, 2006) even though this conclusion is 
contested as well. 
12 These books are: Benz & Papadopoulos (eds.) (2006), Djelic & Sahlin-Anderson (eds.) 
(2006), Marcusson & Tørfing (eds.) (2007), and Sørensen & Tørfing (eds.) (2007). 
13 Petersons has a public-choice inspired focus on municipalities’ competitive needs for 
economic growth, and how economic and fiscal structures in local government results/favours 
developmental policies. 
14 Central government seems to appreciate this development, and is looking for good examples 
of successful partnerships.  An indication of  the interest in this issue is the fact that the 
Norwegian Research Council has initiated a research-program focusing partnerships, 
governance and developmental policies. 
15 Based on OECD Economic Studies a Green paper conclude that the degree of fiscal 
autonomy is substantially more restricted in Norwegian municipalities compared to other 
European countries (NOU, 2005: 6, 139). 
16 Ulike many other countries, local city councils in Norway have few opportunities to decide 
the tax rate (except for property tax).  However, there seems to be a trend among some 
political parties to open up for more discretion for local governments in this issue. 
17 In all the sectors (technical sector, welfare services, the school system and kindergartens) 
there are nationally regulations delimiting the degree of discretion for local governments to 
increase the fees. 
18 In the Norwegian language ’utgift til inntekts ervervelse’. 
19 In  the Norwegian language ‘inntekts til utgifts ervervelse’. In the budgetary debate these two 
phrases are often used by CEOs in the municipalities. 
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20 For an example of how partnerships and governance networks are impacting local policy, 
see for instance Sørensen and Torfing (2000). 
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